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I. Introduction
Two years and nine months have passed since Korea and the United States put 
their signatures on the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA). Nei-
ther Korea nor the United States has yet ratifi ed the agreement. Nonetheless, the 
countries’ trajectories leading to the present have been signifi cantly different. In 
spite of political opposition and fi erce protest, the Korean governing party has 
been taking painful steps toward ratifi cation in the National Assembly. Through 
thunder and storm, the ratifi cation bill cleared the fi rst hurdle of the Committee 
of Foreign Affairs, Trade, and Reunifi cation in December 2008. No such com-
parable effort has even begun in the United States.
The nature of the majority of the governing party in the National Assembly means 
that ratifi cation in Korea is not a matter of whether, but of when. The fate of the 
KORUS FTA in the United States is less and less debated in political circles, 
thereby causing suspicion about the U.S. commitment to free trade. Delayed 
ratifi cation in Washington was not entirely unpredictable when the KORUS FTA 
was entered into agreement in June 2007. The House of Representative of the 
U.S. Congress was then controlled by the Democrats, who were openly criti-
cal of the Bush administration’s drive for an FTA. However, few would have 
predicted this much prolonged delay and inaction. 
In 2008, while the Democratic Party’s presidential candidates in the United 
States were busy bashing the KORUS FTA as unfair, the newly elected Korean 
president was trying to carry out the former Korean president’s commitment 
to the unrestricted import of the U.S. beef, as he placed the highest priority in 
global affairs on the Korea-U.S. alliance. As it turns out, political naiveté and 
Internet politics almost blew away his presidency in his very fi rst year.
Now with a Democratic president in the White House and Congress dominated 
by the Democratic Party, free and open trade has taken a back seat. President 
Barack Obama’s track record in keeping the U.S. commitment to free trade 
has been disappointing. He succumbed to pressure from labor unions and 
sided with them at the expense of Mexican trucking services and Chinese tires. 
Even though Obama and his staff do not continue to assail the KORUS FTA 
as unfair, as they did during the election campaign, it is equally true that they 
do not seem to have any clue how to move the KORUS FTA forward. And it 
is not just the KORUS FTA but two other FTAs—one with Panama and the 
other with Columbia—concluded by the Bush administration as well as the 
Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations launched in November 2001 for 
which the Obama administration has failed to develop a strategic plan to move 
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forward. In Washington, it is no longer a secret that the U.S. initiative of free 
and open trade, which helped to create and maintain the global trading system, 
is an endangered species.1
Although U.S. domestic politics is embroiled in other important domestic busi-
ness such as health care reform, climate change, and Afghanistan, Korea has 
been vigorously pursuing FTAs. During the unfolding global economic crisis, 
this Korean drive is all the more remarkable. In July 2009, Korea struck a deal 
with the European Union (EU) to create an FTA between Korea and 27 members 
of the EU. Korea also concluded an FTA with India, and it became effective. 
Korea’s negotiations with Australia and New Zealand are also moving along. 
These developments imply that delayed ratifi cation of the KORUS FTA is most 
costly. Nonetheless, U.S. politicians seem oblivious to this.
II. Why Renegotiation Is Such a Flawed Idea2
The major opposition to the KORUS FTA comes from the United Auto Workers 
(UAW) and some U.S. automobile manufacturers. They argue that the KORUS 
FTA will not be effective in improving their access to the Korean market. It is 
noteworthy that they have taken this position prior to the beginning of the ne-
gotiations and continue to repeat the same argument even after they have seen 
the agreed outcome (Choi and Choi 2008).
A closer analysis of the KORUS FTA reveals that the auto chapter in the agree-
ment is fairly well balanced and tried to answer all the U.S. concerns about 
market access to Korea. Korea has agreed to an immediate elimination of the 
8 percent tariff on automobile imports. The United States, in contrast, will 
eliminate the 2.5 percent tariff on automobile imports immediately for small to 
mid-sized cars with engines smaller than 3000 cc only, and eliminate the tariff 
in three years for the rest. The 25 percent tariff on pickups will be eliminated 
over a period of 10 years. Furthermore, at the insistence of the United States, a 
special dispute resolution procedure was included in the FTA—speedy resolu-
tion of disputes and reinstating the 2.5 percent U.S. tariff on passenger cars for 
all vehicles imported from Korea in the event Korea might fail to implement 
its auto-related FTA obligations. The Korean government has also agreed to 
streamline its domestic taxation system on automobiles.
Since the Democratic Party won the White House and gained control of the 
Congress after the 2008 election, there has been rampant speculation that the 
1 Barfi eld and Levy (2009) are critical of this sorry state of free and open trade in Washington.
2 Renegotiation means reopening the agreed-upon text with the aim of revising it. 
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United States might seek renegotiation of the KORUS FTA in order to take care 
of opposition from the auto-related sector. After every effort was made to address 
U.S. concern about formal and informal barriers in the automobile trade, it is 
unreasonable for the United States to reopen the agreement for renegotiation.
There are several more reasons why renegotiating the KORUS FTA is a fl awed 
idea.3
First, the perception that the automobile trade between Korea and the United 
States is “unfair” is far from the market reality. The U.S. trade defi cit against 
Korea in the automobile industry is not the result of the Korean government 
discriminating against U.S. imports; instead, it is due to the lack of U.S. com-
petitiveness. Thanks to the vast domestic market, the Big Three from Detroit 
have not paid much attention to the market dynamics of foreign markets, which 
has led to the growing U.S. defi cit in automobile trade worldwide, with foreign 
consumers preferring German or Japanese imports.
Sales of imported vehicles in Korea have grown dramatically in recent years. The 
driving force behind this growth has been the surge of imports from Germany 
and Japan. German auto imports increased 9-fold between 2000 and 2007, and 
Japanese auto imports increased 18-fold. During that same period, U.S. imports 
also increased by a factor of fi ve, but this growth is less stellar when compared 
with the performance of autos from Germany and Japan. The disappointing 
performance of the Big Three can be attributed to the Big Three themselves for 
failing to compete with other foreign imports; it is not due to the Korean market 
being closed to imports.
Populist politics continue to paint the Korean market as an impenetrable fortress 
against U.S. cars.4 If Detroit were to pick a fi ght with anyone, it should have 
been Europe or Japan, whose imports have long been squeezing the Big Three 
in the U.S. market. Targeting Korea is a glaring example of a scapegoat driven 
by local politics.
With the benefi t of hindsight, we can see that Detroit was in bad shape even 
before the KORUS FTA talks. Management failed to come up with fuel-effi cient 
vehicles, labor unions fought to maintain salaries and pensions in excess of 
workers’ productivity, and politicians currying favor for votes helped keep the 
3 The four main arguments against renegotiation of the KORUS FTA draw on Choi (2009). 
4 The market share of imported autos in Korea was below 1 percent in the 1990s, when U.S. politicians 
complained about the closedness of the Korean market. As of 2009 imported autos account for 7 
percent of the Korean market. Choi (2009) offers an in-depth analysis of the Korean market. 
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ineffi cient and unproductive automobile industry afl oat past its prime. It is easier 
to blame trading partners for being unfair than it is to admit that the reason for 
trouble lies at home.
The trade imbalance in autos between Korea and the United States does not 
represent the protectionism of Korea but, rather, illustrates the failure of U.S. 
automobile manufacturers to compete in the global market. To pick at the auto 
provisions of the FTA and demand renegotiation would delude the U.S. public 
into believing that U.S. car sales can be improved by changing agreement texts 
instead of by changing company management.
Second, demanding to renegotiate a certain section of an FTA that has already 
been concluded and signed is to ignore the principle of good faith in international 
negotiations. Renegotiation of one section of the FTA would upset the careful 
balance that has been struck through a long series of negotiations. In its essence, 
an FTA puts the trade of all goods and services on the table and aims to remove 
barriers through trade-offs between the various sectors. These trade-offs are 
made on the basis of considerations of the comparative advantage and politi-
cal sensitivities of each side. Negotiations can be concluded when both parties 
perceive the trade-offs to have reached a balance in interests. Thus, a concluded 
and signed treaty implies that both parties have made the political decision to 
accept the results of the negotiations. The KORUS FTA was the result of such 
a process. A unilateral demand for renegotiations based on the dissatisfaction 
of one sector is simply improper and unfair.
Third, the KORUS FTA negotiations were carried out under the Trade Promo-
tion Authority (TPA) of the United States. TPA is a promise between the U.S. 
executive and legislative branches that any trade agreement signed by the U.S. 
government before June 30, 2007, would be put to an up-or-down vote on the 
treaty text as is, without allowing any amendments to be made by Congress. 
This was the assumption under which the U.S. and Korean governments carried 
out the negotiations. If a member of Congress is not happy with the auto chapter 
in the KORUS FTA, that member is free to vote against the ratifi cation. If the 
member of Congress decides that the KORUS FTA in its entirety is acceptable, 
despite alleged problems in the auto chapter, then the member may vote for the 
ratifi cation. Demanding renegotiation of one section of the agreement is a breach 
of the assumption upon which the negotiations had been based.
Renegotiating the automobile provision is a fl awed idea in terms of economics, 
the international code of conduct, and consequences to future negotiations. If the 
United States were to ask for a renegotiation in the automobile sector, it would 
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open a Pandora’s box. Korea would be brought to demand concessions in other 
sectors in order to maintain an equitable balance. During the course of this pro-
cess, it is highly likely that the debate will spill beyond the strict boundaries of 
technicalities of trade negotiations and fuel broader confl icts in Korean society. 
Political instability in Korea may do harm to the Korea-U.S. alliance. Korea and 
the United States should refrain from renegotiating the agreed-upon text. Instead, 
they should look for a mutually acceptable course of action because saving the 
KORUS FTA is in the interests of Korea and the United States.
III. Costs of Delay
Economic Costs
As a country that relies on trade for approximately 90 percent of its gross do-
mestic product, Korea is in constant need to upgrade terms and conditions of 
market access to foreign countries. As the Korean products lose their price com-
petitiveness in the global marketplace because of the fast rise in Korean work-
ers’ wage rates and intensifi ed competition from emerging economies, Korea’s 
market share in the United States has undergone a steady and slow decrease. 
U.S. products have also experienced this trend of decreasing market share in the 
Korean market. The KORUS FTA is a strategy to overturn this trend.
Korea is in need of attracting high-quality foreign investment. The bilateral in-
vestment treaty (BIT) initiatives of the Kim Dae-jung government in the wake of 
the 1997 Asian fi nancial crisis composed a strategy to enhance Korea’s national 
credibility in the international community. There has been steady infl ow of U.S. 
investment into Korea. Service industries proved to be major business opportuni-
ties to the United States: the United States increased its investments in textiles, 
chemicals, pharmaceuticals, transportation equipment, foods and lodging, real 
estate and leasing, electricity, gas, water, construction, and, in particular, the 
fi nancial services industry. Since 2005, the total U.S. investment to Korea and 
the percentage of U.S. foreign direct investment compared with Korea’s total 
inward foreign direct investment have exhibited a slow decrease. The KORUS 
FTA may turn this trend around. In the KORUS FTA, the Korean government 
committed to reduce investment barriers in legal services, accounting services, 
and communications services and put in place more expeditious investment-
related dispute settlement procedures.
As the ratifi cation of the KORUS FTA is dragging on, two kinds of economic 
risks have emerged. First is the risk of trade creation loss. Because of the delay, 
benefi ts of preferential market access for goods, services, and investment are not 
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materializing. All these benefi ts are just on paper. The economic opportunities 
of both Korea and the United States are being hurt.5
Second is the risk of trade diversion. Since the KORUS FTA was signed in June 
2007, Korea has entered into a series of high-profi le FTAs with large trading 
partners. The biggest one is the FTA with the EU, which was struck in July 2009 
and is in the process of getting ratifi ed with a goal of becoming effective in the 
later part of 2010. Korea’s FTAs with India and with the 10 members of ASEAN 
are also noteworthy. The Korea-EU FTA poses a serious and substantial threat 
to the commercial interests of the United States, including automobiles, legal 
services, and accounting services.
The U.S. side also needs to pay attention to ongoing FTA talks between Korea 
and Australia as well as Korea and New Zealand. If the ratifi cation of the KORUS 
FTA is delayed beyond 2010, these countries, which have agricultural products 
in competition with U.S. agricultural products in the Korean market, may catch 
up with the KORUS FTA.
From the standpoint of the United States, Korea’s FTAs with these economies 
imply the increasing likelihood of trade moving away from U.S. products, ser-
vices, and investment. This is likely to be severe and to the disadvantage of the 
U.S. side because the delay is getting longer.
In a nutshell, the delayed ratifi cation of the KORUS FTA is bad news for both 
Korea and the United States, causing substantial economic costs. It is more costly 
in these turbulent times of the global recession. Between Korea and the United 
States, the negative effect resonates more severely on the U.S. side because of 
Korea’s vigorous FTA initiatives with the EU, India, and ASEAN.
Political Costs
Korea has paid dearly to negotiate the KORUS FTA. When Korea decided to 
launch Korea-U.S. talks in early 2006, the decision-making process was kept 
in the dark so that only a few in the administration were informed of the presi-
dent’s decision. Such secrecy was political because President Roh Moo-hyun 
was keenly aware of the political ramifi cations of the KORUS FTA for his power 
base, which consisted of left-leaning members of civil society, farmers, and 
labor unions. In Roh’s effort to bring the reluctant United States to the negotiat-
ing table, he made concessions in some important areas such as resuming U.S. 
beef imports (albeit under some restricted conditions) and reducing the screen 
5 USITC (2007) assesses the economic effects of the KORUS FTA on the basis of the agreed text.
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quota (which broke down the Korea-U.S. BIT talks that had been initiated by 
his predecessor, Kim Dae-jung).
President Roh’s hunch was confi rmed before long. Korean left-wing groups 
forged a grand coalition and campaigned against the KORUS FTA throughout 
the whole negotiation process. They organized a massive, sometimes violent, 
rally where the negotiations were taking place. They claimed that the KORUS 
FTA would pave a road to serfdom to U.S. imperialism and the brutal forces of 
fi nancial capitalism.6 Their infl uence was visible in the Korean media’s cover-
age of the KORUS FTA. Throughout the whole negotiation process, the entire 
country was sharply divided. To counter this negative and often unfair perception 
and dispel misinformation spread systematically by the opposition group, the 
Korean president and his administration had to allocate a tremendous amount 
of economic and political resources.
Even when the talks were concluded in April 2007, the United States requested 
another round of additional talks simply because of its domestic logjam in trade 
politics.7 This new trade policy accommodated the concerns of the Democratic 
Party on the consequences of trade in labor and the environment. These con-
cerns are targeted to the Latin American countries, not Korea. Nonetheless, 
U.S. negotiators asked that the same template be added to the agreed text of the 
FTA between Korea and the United States. Hence, the Korean side had to sit 
down again at the bargaining table with the United States in order to save the 
KORUS FTA.
In the process leading to ratifi cation, the Korean side had to pay more political 
costs. The U.S. Congress pressed the Korean side hard, claiming that ratifi ca-
tion would not be obtained without full imports of U.S. beef to Korea. Korean 
trade offi cials were accepting the argument that “resolving the beef dispute is 
imperative for obtaining ratifi cation in the United States.” President Roh, who 
had verbally committed to the full import of U.S. beef, did not implement his 
pledge before he left offi ce. Responsibility fell squarely on the shoulders of 
incoming President Lee. And the world witnessed months of Korean citizens 
holding candlelight vigils protesting against the decision to fully import U.S. 
beef.
6 Such a grand public campaign against the KORUS FTA is not so much against market opening but 
is a manifestation of anti-Americanism, as analyzed in detail by Choi (2010). No active campaigns 
such as this was seen in the case of Korea-EU FTA. 
7 The United States produced its so-called new trade policy in May 2007. This was a compromise 
between the Bush administration and the Democratic Party, which controlled the House of Repre-
sentatives.
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Because of all the political assets expended for the KORUS FTA by the Korean 
side, the delayed ratifi cation of the KORUS FTA simply because of U.S. domestic 
politics runs the risk of backfi ring in Korea. When the U.S. presidential election 
in 2008 turned to the KORUS FTA and leading Democratic Party candidates 
assailed it for its alleged unfairness in automobile trade, anti–KORUS FTA 
groups and politicians in Korea welcomed the U.S. development. They took it as 
a golden opportunity to up the ante against the new Korean administration and 
regain the political ground they had lost in their landslide defeat in the Korean 
presidential election in December 2007 and the National Assembly election in 
April 2008.
Any U.S. attempt to renegotiate the KORUS FTA would disrupt the Korean 
political landscape, causing additional schisms that will dry up the political as-
sets of the Korean government. Even though eventually the United States may 
decide not to renegotiate, while the delay is getting longer it will cause political 
diffi culties on the Korean side.
The current Korean administration attaches the utmost priority to the Korea-
U.S. alliance in its global strategy for peace and stability. The KORUS FTA is 
considered to be a cornerstone of this alliance: commitment to free and open 
trade, a market economy, and the rule of law. As the delay is becoming longer, 
the Korean side may become more and more doubtful about the U.S. ability to 
deliver on its international commitment. For all these reasons, the political costs 
of delay for the U.S. side could become considerable.
Strategic Costs
Korea, located at the end of the peninsula of the Asian continent, has as its 
destiny to confront forces from both land and ocean. For Korea—a relatively 
small country compared with China, Japan, Russia, and the United States—to 
survive, Korea needs a strategy that can utilize the competition among those 
neighboring countries to its advantage. Mindful of its geopolitical location, Korea 
developed a blueprint of increasing its economic ties with major economies and 
took on the role of a global hub for FTAs. In this big picture, the EU, China, 
Japan, and the United States were ultimate FTA partners. The biggest obstacle 
to achieving this goal was market opening in the agriculture sector. Without a 
strategy for addressing farmers’ protests and a well-thought-out plan for dealing 
with structural weakness in the Korean agricultural sector, any meaningful FTA 
with any of these major economies would be inconceivable.
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From the U.S. perspective, the KORUS FTA offers a golden opportunity to 
reclaim its commitment to Northeast Asia after a decade of declining infl uence. 
The Korea-U.S. alliance has been undergoing tumultuous times during the most 
recent decade. During the time span of a decade, China has overtaken the status 
of the United States and emerged as the largest trade and investment partner of 
Korea. A left-leaning government, elected on the wave of anti-American senti-
ment, sought a lesser U.S. military presence in Korea. As North Korea went 
down the path to nuclearization, China’s leverage in Northeast Asia increased 
greatly because of its close economic and military relations with North Korea. 
This development was not welcomed by the United States, which considered 
China a potential competitor and ultimate threat. The United States worried that, 
if this trend went unchecked, the political gravity could shift from the United 
States to China.
For the United States, the KORUS FTA is a golden opportunity to overturn this 
trend and reclaim the U.S. commitment in Northeast Asia. During the eight years 
of the George W. Bush administration, the United States completed three FTAs 
with Asian countries: Singapore, Australia, and Korea. The United States deliv-
ered two FTAs. If the United States fails to deliver its FTA with Korea within a 
reasonable period of time, it will send the wrong signal to its partners.
For Korea, the KORUS FTA will play the role of slowing down Korea’s rapid 
integration with China in trade and investment. The KORUS FTA will enhance 
Korea’s negotiating leverage in Northeast Asia and the international arena. Three 
examples substantiate this argument:
Example 1: The EU, traditionally lukewarm about an FTA outside EU territory, 
approached Korea for an FTA because of its concern about trade diversion as 
the KORUS FTA became an increasing possibility.
Example 2: Immediately after the conclusion of the KORUS FTA, top Chinese 
political leaders expressed a strong interest in pursuing an FTA with Korea.
Example 3: Japan is concerned that its exports to Korea may be substantially 
replaced by U.S. products and services because of the KORUS FTA. To minimize 
the negative effect, Japanese business leaders and politicians are voicing their 
demand for resuming the Korea-Japan FTA talks, which have been suspended 
since November 2004.
As the ratifi cation process of the KORUS FTA continues to be delayed, China’s 
interest and sense of urgency in creating an FTA with Korea are decreasing.
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Delayed ratifi cation also means a setback for Korea’s global FTA strategy. If 
delay is prolonged beyond 2010, it may create a situation where Korea may have 
to reassess its global FTA strategy. In the new picture, the United States may 
not occupy, at least economically, the center stage as it does in Korea’s current 
global FTA strategy.
IV. How to Save the KORUS FTA
The cost of delaying the KORUS FTA is severe in economic, political, and 
strategic terms. The longer the delay becomes, the higher the cost to both Ko-
rea and the United States. Korea and the United States share an interest in the 
eventual ratifi cation of the KORUS FTA, yet stumbling blocks exist on the path 
to ratifi cation.
Although the Obama administration places a high value on the KORUS FTA in 
terms of its enormous economic opportunities, the strengthening of the Korea-
U.S. alliance, and improving the leverage of the United States in Northeast 
Asia, the FTA is unlikely to move forward without addressing the concerns 
about automobiles. The Korean government, however, has made it clear that it 
will not renegotiate the auto provisions of the KORUS FTA. It does not want 
to reopen the KORUS FTA because it believes the current agreement refl ects a 
well-balanced interest between the two countries.
Ratifi cation of an international treaty is dominated by domestic politics: delay is 
just a refl ection of political stalemate. Precisely because of this, political leader-
ship is a dire necessity on the U.S. side. Prolonged delay beyond a reasonable 
period of patience—such as a delay into 2011 after the U.S. midterm elections—
will send a signal to the global community that the United States has dismally 
failed to deliver on its promise with an important strategic ally in a geopolitically 
unstable region. Drift without sense of direction is not an option.
How can the KORUS FTA be saved?8
Because it is in the interest of both Korea and the United States to ratify the 
KORUS FTA within a reasonably early time frame, both governments need to 
develop a common strategic blueprint, share it, and implement it.
The fi rst step in this blueprint is sequencing. In light of domestic politics, Korea 
can ratify the KORUS FTA ahead of the United States, and Korea should go 
ahead and do this. There are three positive effects that Korea may bring about 
8 The argument below for this question draws on Choi (2009). 
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by ratifying fi rst. First, such an action shows Korea’s willingness to put into ac-
tion an idea accepted around the world that protectionism is not the solution to 
the global recession. Second, the Korean government can focus on other press-
ing issues by declaring an end to the domestic KORUS FTA debate. Third, by 
ratifying ahead of the United States, Korea throws the ball into the U.S. court, 
telling U.S. politicians to take it or leave it in its entirety pursuant to the U.S. 
fast-track procedure. Once ratifi ed in Korea, re-ratifi cation of the KORUS FTA 
in the eventuality of renegotiation is tantamount to political suicide.9
If Korea does not strategically utilize the opportunity to ratify fi rst when it can, 
U.S. politicians will take this as Korea’s willingness to renegotiate the existing 
agreement as a remedy to the complaints of the automobile industry. In this 
sense, Korea might be digging its own grave and lead the United States to request 
renegotiation. If the United States requests renegotiation, Korea, to balance the 
negotiation, would have no choice but to bring other issues to the table as well. In 
deciding which subjects to reopen, heated debate would be rekindled in Korean 
politics and would generate additional heated political frictions in Korea.
The second step is U.S. political leadership. The history of ratifi cation of high-
profi le trade agreements in the United States shows that it has always been the 
administration, and the president himself, who has initiated the process and 
launched a massive public campaign for ratifi cation. The North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) ratifi cation in 1993 is a prominent example (Mayer 
1998). To counter the emotional opposition to NAFTA that claimed NAFTA 
would result in “a giant sucking sound,” an expression implying a massive dis-
location of jobs from the U.S. South to Mexico, President Bill Clinton and his 
staff reached out to the public, arguing that more well-paid jobs would be created. 
Clinton persuaded fence-sitting politicians, mostly from his own party, to vote 
in favor of NAFTA. Without presidential leadership, NAFTA ratifi cation would 
have been lost. Granting permanent normal trading relations (PNTR, meaning 
most-favored-nation status) to China in 2000 is another example. Against strong 
opposition in the name of human rights, the U.S. administration launched a pub-
lic campaign of embracing China for economic opportunities and engagement. 
Support of PNTR prevailed. Interestingly enough, these hotly contested votes 
in the U.S. Congress took place when the president came from the Democratic 
Party. Something similar should be happening to the KORUS FTA.
9 Some may criticize that Korea’s fi rst move would remove its room for being fl exible. Becoming 
infl exible is precisely the key. Otherwise, it would not have any strategic value, as any game-theorist 
would predict. 
             Navigating Turbulence in Northeast Asia: The Future of the U.S.-ROK Alliance    57
If Korea completes its ratifi cation procedure ahead of the United States, Obama’s 
job in persuading Congress would be a bit easier. He could point out to members 
of Congress that the United States will have to forgo renegotiation in light of 
Korean political sensitivity. The fact that Korea has concluded an FTA with the 
EU would also help Obama ask Congress to take the ratifi cation of the KORUS 
FTA more seriously.10 Delay would mean ever-increasing costs, to the disad-
vantage of the U.S. side. Whether and when Obama rises to this challenge is a 
critical test of presidential leadership.
V. Conclusion
If the United States would like to address some complaints from the UAW and 
domestic auto manufacturers through the renegotiation of the agreed-upon text 
of the KORUS FTA or through another form of managed trade, it would be bad 
economics and short-sighted politics. Managed trade is not a way forward. If 
Korea and the United States have a common interest in advancing the KORUS 
FTA for ratifi cation, both governments should map out a concerted strategic 
blueprint.
The world community has been patiently waiting for a decision from Washington 
regarding the pending FTAs and the Doha Round. If somehow the United States 
fails to ratify the KORUS FTA in 2010, there is a danger that the KORUS FTA 
could become increasingly irrelevant. This is mainly because the Korea-EU 
FTA is likely to go into effect in the second part of 2010. From the viewpoint 
of forging a strong alliance, such prolonged inaction cannot be a right course 
of action. 
Although Seoul is making progress with various FTAs, the KORUS FTA is still 
at the core of Korea’s vision of FTA networking. If, however, Korea continues 
to use the KORUS FTA as the cornerstone of its FTA networking, this policy 
could backfi re because of the uncertain future in Washington of the KORUS 
FTA. The moment of truth for the KORUS FTA is approaching rapidly. Whither 
the KORUS FTA?
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